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Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries

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Author Info

  • Werden, G.J.
  • G.J.
  • Froeb, L.M.

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division in its series Papers with number 95-02.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:usjuat:95-02

Contact details of provider:
Postal: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ANTITRUST DIVISION, JUDICIARY CENTER BUILDING 555 4TH ST. N.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20001 U.S.A..
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Web page: http://www.justice.gov/atr/
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Related research

Keywords: MERGERS; PRICES; ENTREPRISES;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Cramton & Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, 2008. "The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35," Papers of Peter Cramton 08ibsaa, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.
  2. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2009. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," Working Papers 82/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  3. Douglas Davis & Bart Wilson, 2006. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion, Mergers and Synergies: An Experimental Investigation of Differentiated Product Competition," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 169-194.
  4. Marie Goppelsroeder & Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra, 2006. "Quantifying the Scope for Efficiency Defense in Merger Control: The Werden-Froeb-Index," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-074/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb & Steven Tschantz & Gregory Werden, 1999. "Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 205-217, November.
  6. Ronald Cotterill & William Putsis, 2000. "Market Share and Price Setting Behavior for Private Labels and National Brands," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 17-39, August.
  7. Luke Froeb & Gregory Werden, 2000. "An Introduction to the Symposium on the Use of Simulation in Applied Industrial Organization," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 133-137.
  8. Gregory Werden, 2000. "Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: Monopoly Cases and Alternative Approaches," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 211-218, March.
  9. Jith Jayaratne & Carl Shapiro, 2000. "Simulating Partial Asset Divestitures to 'Fix' Mergers," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 179-200.
  10. Froeb, Luke & Tschantz, Steven & Werden, Gregory J., 2005. "Pass-through rates and the price effects of mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 703-715, December.
  11. Froeb, Luke & Tschantz, Steven & Crooke, Philip, 2003. "Bertrand competition with capacity constraints: mergers among parking lots," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 49-67, March.
  12. Jerome Foncel & Marc Ivaldi & Jrisy Motis, 2008. "An Econometric Workbench for Comparing the Substantive and Dominance Tests in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Working Papers 0833, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  13. Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, 2003. "European Merger Control: Do We Need an Efficiency Defence?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 57-85, March.
  14. Gregory Werden & Luke Froeb & James Langenfeld, 2000. "Lost Profits from Patent Infringement: The Simulation Approach," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 213-227.
  15. Cory S. Capps & David Dranove & Shane Greenstein & Mark Satterthwaite, 2001. "The Silent Majority Fallacy of the Elzinga-Hogarty Criteria: A Critique and New Approach to Analyzing Hospital Mergers," NBER Working Papers 8216, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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