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Market-Share Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and the Integer Problem

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  • Zhijun Chen
  • Greg Shaffer

Abstract

Exclusionary contracts have long been a focus of antitrust law and the subject of much scholarly debate. This paper compares two types of exclusionary contracts, exclusive-dealing and market-share contracts, in a model of naked exclusion. We discuss the different mechanisms through which each works and identify a fundamental tradeoff that arises: market-share contracts are better at maximizing a seller’s benefit from foreclosure (because they allow the seller to obtain any foreclosure level it desires) whereas exclusive-dealing contracts are better at minimizing a seller’s cost of foreclosure (because, unlike with market-share contracts, the seller does not have to overpay for the units it forecloses). We identify settings in which each can be more profitable and show that welfare can be worse under market-share contracts

Suggested Citation

  • Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 2019. "Market-Share Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and the Integer Problem," Monash Economics Working Papers 08-18, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2018-08
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    File URL: https://www.monash.edu/business/economics/research/publications/publications2/0818MarketshareChen.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cédric Argenton, 2010. "Exclusive Quality," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 690-716, September.
    2. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2009. "Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1850-1877, December.
    3. Abito, Jose Miguel & Wright, Julian, 2008. "Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 227-246, January.
    4. Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 2014. "Naked exclusion with minimum-share requirements," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 64-91, March.
    5. Enrique Ide & Juan-Pablo Montero & Nicolás Figueroa, 2016. "Discounts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(7), pages 1849-1877, July.
    6. David Mills, 2010. "Inducing Downstream Selling Effort with Market Share Discounts," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(2), pages 129-146.
    7. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    8. Roman Inderst & Greg Shaffer, 2010. "Market‐share contracts as facilitating practices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 709-729, December.
    9. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2012. "Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(1), pages 150-170, March.
    10. John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2014. "Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 672-686, February.
    11. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    12. Adrian Majumdar & Greg Shaffer, 2009. "Market‐Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 393-421, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2023. "Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 158-176, January.
    2. Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2024. "Naked exclusion with heterogeneous buyers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    3. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2024. "Economic Principles for the Enforcement of Abuse of Dominance Provisions," Working Papers 1431, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme & Trégouët, Thomas, 2021. "Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolo, Vincenzo, 2020. "Exploiting rivals' strengths," CEPR Discussion Papers 15520, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme & Trégouët, Thomas, 2021. "Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exclusive dealing; Market-share contracts; Dominant Firm; Foreclosure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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