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Market‐Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information

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  • Adrian Majumdar
  • Greg Shaffer

Abstract

In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market‐share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the full‐information outcome (unlike in standard screening models, where the agent earns an information rent in the high‐demand state and output is distorted in the low‐demand state). Our results have implications for fidelity rebates, all‐units discounts, and competition policy. Although some crowding out of the fringe may occur when demand is low, we show that market‐share contracts need not be harmful for welfare.

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  • Adrian Majumdar & Greg Shaffer, 2009. "Market‐Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 393-421, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:18:y:2009:i:2:p:393-421
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00218.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2015. "Nonlinear pricing and exclusion: I. buyer opportunism," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 217-240, June.
    2. Greer, Katja, 2013. "Limiting rival's efficiency via conditional discounts," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79730, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 2019. "Market Share Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and the Integer Problem," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 208-242, February.
    4. Katja Greer, 2013. "Limiting rival's efficiency via conditional discounts," Working Papers 132, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    5. Sreya Kolay & Greg Shaffer, 2013. "Contract Design with a Dominant Retailer and a Competitive Fringe," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(9), pages 2111-2116, September.
    6. Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2020. "Loyalty discounts and price-cost tests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    7. Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 2016. "Are Market-Share Contracts a Poor Man’s Exclusive Dealing?," Monash Economics Working Papers 44-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    8. Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 2014. "Naked exclusion with minimum-share requirements," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 64-91, March.
    9. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2014. "Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 325-347, February.
    10. Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolò, 2015. "Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(11), pages 3321-3351, November.
    11. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2014. "Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Quantity Discounts and Private Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(577), pages 776-804, June.
    12. Zhou, Jianheng & Zhao, Ruijuan & Wang, Weishen, 2019. "Pricing decision of a manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(3), pages 809-820.
    13. Johannes Paha, 2017. "Wholesale Pricing with Incomplete Information about Private Label Products," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201736, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    14. Roman Inderst & Greg Shaffer, 2010. "Market‐share contracts as facilitating practices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 709-729, December.
    15. Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2010. "All-Unit Discounts and the Problem of Surplus Division," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(3), pages 161-178, November.
    16. Yong Chao & Guofu Tan & Adam Chi Leung Wong, 2018. "All†units discounts as a partial foreclosure device," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 155-180, March.
    17. Rajib L. Saha & Sumanta Singha & Subodha Kumar, 2021. "Does Congestion Always Hurt? Managing Discount Under Congestion in a Game-Theoretic Setting," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(4), pages 1347-1367, December.
    18. Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolo, Vincenzo, 2020. "Exploiting rivals' strengths," CEPR Discussion Papers 15520, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2011. "On the anti-competitive effects of quantity discounts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 337-341, May.
    20. Martin Peitz & Dongsoo Shin, 2013. "Upstream Market Power and Wasteful Retailers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(1), pages 234-253, January.
    21. Ordover, Janusz A. & Shaffer, Greg, 2013. "Exclusionary discounts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 569-586.
    22. Navid Mojir & K. Sudhir, 2021. "A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for B2B Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share of Wallet Contracts," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2315, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    23. Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolo, Vincenzo, 2018. "Price-cost tests and loyalty discounts," CEPR Discussion Papers 12924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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