Articles
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001.
"Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-37, July.
Other versions: Cited by:
- Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002.
"Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains,"
Working Papers
0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Hannu Vartiainen, 2007.
"Dynamic Farsighted Stability,"
Discussion Papers
22, Aboa Centre for Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009.
"Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
[Downloadable!]
- Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2003.
"The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election,"
Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces
E2003/26, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001.
"Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
492.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:- Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo, 2003.
"Candidate Stability And Voting Correspondences,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
666, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2006.
"Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 545-570, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Salvador Barber?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Lars Ehlers, 2002.
"Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
512.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009.
"Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott,"
Working Papers
2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- John A. Weymark, 2000.
"Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice,"
Working Papers
0029, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Feb 2001.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:- Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark, 2001.
"Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice,"
Working Papers
0113, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
- Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark, 2003.
"Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice,"
Economic Theory,
Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 233-243, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- EHLERS, Lars & WEYMARK, John A., 2001.
"Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice,"
Cahiers de recherche
2001-30, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!]
- Taylor, Curtis & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005.
"Public Information and Electoral Bias,"
Working Papers
05-11, Duke University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Ehlers,Lars & Storcken,Ton, 2001.
"Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments,"
Research Memoranda
006, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:- EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2002.
"Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments,"
Cahiers de recherche
2002-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!]
- Ehlers, L. & Storcken, T., 2002.
"Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments,"
Cahiers de recherche
2002-03, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
[Downloadable!]
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Camelia Bejan, 2009.
"No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems,"
Working Papers
2009-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2007.
"Arrow's Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences,"
Research Memoranda
043, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
- Bernardo Moreno & M. Puy, 2009.
"Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 145-162, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Bordes, Georges & Campbell, Donald E & Le Breton, Michel, 1995.
"Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 441-54, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002.
"Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains,"
Working Papers
0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - BOSSERT, Walter & WEYMARK, J.A., 2006.
"Social Choice: Recent Developments,"
Cahiers de recherche
2006-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - M. Fleurbaey & A. Trannoy, 2000.
"The Impossibility of a Paretian Egalitarian,"
THEMA Working Papers
2000-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Laffond, Gilbert & Laslier, Jean Francois & Le Breton, Michel, 1994.
"Social-Choice Mediators,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 448-53, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- Le Breton, Michel, 2006.
"On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Integer Payoffs,"
IDEI Working Papers
411, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
- Jean-François Laslier, 2003.
"Party objectives in the "Divide a dollar" electoral competition,"
Working Papers
hal-00242987_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!]
- LASLIER, Jean-Franois & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000.
"Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
- Le Breton, M & Owen, G & Weber, S, 1992.
"Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 419-27.
Other versions:
- Le Breton, M. & Owen, G. & Weber, S., 1991.
"Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games,"
Papers
92-3, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Le Breton, M. & Owen, G. & Weber, S., 1991.
"Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games,"
G.R.E.Q.A.M.
91a09, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Le Breton,Michel & Owen,Guillermo & Weber,Shlomo, 1991.
"Strongly balanced cooperative games,"
Discussion Paper Serie A
338, University of Bonn, Germany.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990.
"The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-27.
Cited by:
- Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008.
"Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction,"
MPRA Paper
11728, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
- Mathieu Martin, 2002.
"On the emptiness of the stability set of order d,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 313-326, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1993.
"Farsighted Coalitional Stability,"
Working Papers
_001, University of Chicago, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Roland Pongou & Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2008.
"Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule,"
Economic Theory,
Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 555-574, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Mathieu Martin (THEMA - CNRS) & Vincent Merlin (CREM – CNRS), 2006.
"On the Chacteristic Numbers of Voting Games,"
Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen)
200609, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Vincent Anesi, 2006.
"Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 595-610, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Le Breton, M, 1989.
"A Note on Balancedness and Nonemptiness of the Core in Voting Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 111-17.
Cited by:
- Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007.
"Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty,"
IDEI Working Papers
492, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
- Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004.
"Group Formation with Heterogeneous Sets,"
IDEI Working Papers
288, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
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