Logrolling and a McGarvey Theorem for Separable Tournaments
AbstractIn this note we prove a McGarvey theorem for the family of Separable Tournaments. This family arises in the analysis of Logrolling and Vote Trading in Committees.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 95a08.
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
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Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.
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game theory ; voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Michel Le Breton & Guillaume Hollard, 1996. "Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 451-455.
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- Mala, Jozsef, 1999. "On [lambda]-majority voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 39-44, January.
- Lee Gibson & Robert Powers, 2012. "An extension of McGarvey’s theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 101-108, January.
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