Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets
AbstractIn this paper we consider a model of group formation where group of individuals may have different feasible sets. We focus on two polar cases, increasing returns, when the set of feasible alternatives increases if a new member joins thegroup, and decreasing returns, when a new member has an opposite effect and reduces the number of alternatives available for the enlarged group. We consider two notions, stability and strong stability of group structures, that correspond to Nash and Strong Nash equilibrium of the associated non-cooperative game. We prove existence results for various classes of environments and also investigate the link between the dimensionality of the set of alternatives and the existence of stable structures.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 03-24.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation:
Date of revision: May 2003
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC
feasible sets; stable partitions; positive externality; increasing and decreasing returns;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Le Breton, M, 1989. "A Note on Balancedness and Nonemptiness of the Core in Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 111-17.
- Breton, M. le & Weber, S., 1992.
"Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning,"
Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics
93-6, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 95a06, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Le Breton, M & Owen, G & Weber, S, 1992.
"Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 419-27.
- Le Breton, M. & Owen, G. & Weber, S., 1991. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 91a09, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Le Breton,Michel & Owen,Guillermo & Weber,Shlomo, 1991. "Strongly balanced cooperative games," Discussion Paper Serie A, University of Bonn, Germany 338, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Le Breton, M. & Owen, G. & Weber, S., 1991. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics 92-3, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.