A Note on Balancedness and Nonemptiness of the Core in Voting Games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 18 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
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- Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Group Formation with Heterogeneous Sets," IDEI Working Papers 288, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007.
"Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty,"
IDEI Working Papers
492, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- MichelLe Breton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2010. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 281-312, 03.
- Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, . "Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets," Discussion Papers 03-24, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised May 2003.
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