Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by York (Canada) - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 93-6.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: YORK UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 4700 KEELE ST-NORTH YORK ONTARIO H3J 1P3 CANADA.
Phone: (416) 736-5083
Fax: (416) 736-5987
Web page: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/
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economic models ; economic analysis;
Other versions of this item:
- Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a06, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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- Desmet, Klaus & Le Breton, Michel & Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio & Weber, Shlomo, 2006.
"Nation Formation and Genetic Diversity,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5918, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- DESMET, Klaus & LE BRETON, Michel & ORTUNO-ORTIN, Ignacio & WEBER, Shlomo, 2006. "Nation formation and genetic diversity," CORE Discussion Papers 2006095, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Desmet, Klaus & Le Breton, Michel & Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio, 2006. "Nation Formation and Genetic Diversity," IDEI Working Papers 133, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Yann Braouezec, 2009. "Incomplete third-degree price discrimination, and market partition problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2908-2917.
- Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, . "Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets," Discussion Papers 03-24, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised May 2003.
- Klaus Desmet & Michel Le Breton & Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Shlomo Weber, 2009.
"The Stability and Breakup of Nations: A Quantitative Analysis,"
Vives discussion paper series
10, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, Vives.
- Klaus Desmet & Michel Breton & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín & Shlomo Weber, 2011. "The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 183-213, September.
- Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Group Formation with Heterogeneous Sets," IDEI Working Papers 288, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Yann Braouezec, 2013. "The Welfare Effects of Regulating the Number of Market Segments," Working Papers 2013-ECO-11, IESEG School of Management.
- Quint, Thomas, 1997. "Restricted houseswapping games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 451-470, May.
- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen, 2002. "Stable Coalitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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