Values for Markovian coalition processes
AbstractTime series of coalitions (so-called scenarios) are studied that describe processes of coalition formation where several players may enter or leave the current coalition at any point in (discrete) time and convergence to the grand coalition is not necessarily prescribed. Transitions from one coalition to the next are assumed to be random and to yield a Markov chain. Three examples of such processes (the Shapley-Weber process, the Metropolis process, and an example of a voting situation) and their properties are presented. A main contribution includes notions of value for such series, i.e., schemes for the evaluation of the expected contribution of a player to the coalition process relative to a given cooperative game. Particular processes permit to recover the classical Shapley value. This methodology’s power is illustrated with well-known examples from exchange economies due to Shafer (Econometrica 48:467–476, 1980 ) and Scafuri and Yannelis (Econometrica 52:1365–1368, 1984 ), where the classical Shapley value leads to counterintuitive allocations. The Markovian process value avoids these drawbacks and provides plausible results. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 51 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
13052, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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- repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00912889 is not listed on IDEAS
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"An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
13063, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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- repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00976923 is not listed on IDEAS
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