Nash equilibria in nonsymmetric singleton congestion games with exact partition
AbstractWe define a new class of games, which we qualify as congestion games with exact partition. These games constitute a subfamily of singleton congestion games for which the players are restricted to choose only one strategy, but they each possess their own utility function. The aim of this paper is to develop a method leading to an easier identification of all Nash equilibria in this kind of congestion games. We also give a new proof establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this type of games without invoking the potential function or the finite best-reply property.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 201115.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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