We study social ordering functions in exchange economies. We show that if a social ordering function satisfies certain Pareto, individual rationality, and local independence conditions, then (i) the set of top allocations of the chosen social ordering is contained in the set of Walrasian allocations and is typically non-empty, and (ii) all individually rational but non-Walrasian allocations are typically ranked indifferently. Thus, such a social ordering function is quite similar to the Walrasian correspondence, which can be regarded as the social ordering function whose associated indifference classes are the set of Walrasian allocations and the set of other allocations.
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Volume (Year): 45 (2009) Issue (Month): 1-2 (January) Pages: 16-22 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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