Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
AbstractIn one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space is a one-dimensional continuum such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2N strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corollary we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 64 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Arrovian social choice One-dimensional continuum Single-peaked preferences;
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