Oligarchies in Spatial Environments
AbstractIn spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives according to the Lp-norm (for a fixed p => 1). When the policy space is multi-dimensional and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex, any quasi-transitive welfare function must be oligarchic. As a corollary we obtain that for transitive welfare functions weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2007-08.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2007
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- EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2007. "Oligarchies in Spatial Environments," Cahiers de recherche 09-2007, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Oligarchies in Spatial Environments," Research Memorandum 042, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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