Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments
AbstractArrow's celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals' preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In a unified approach covering the theory of social choice and the theory of fair allocation, we investigate how much information is needed to rank a pair of allocations by social ordering functions and by allocation rules satisfying the Pareto principle and anonymity. In the standard model of division of commodities, we show that knowledge of a good portion of indifference hypersurfaces is needed for social ordering functions, whereas allocation rules require only knowledge of marginal rates of substitution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper with number 2.
Length: 32 p.
Date of creation: Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Note: This version: November 2000 (First version: January 2000)
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Other versions of this item:
- Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2000. "Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments," Discussion Papers 2000-07, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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Economics Working Papers
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Programme National Persée, vol. 51(5), pages 1215-1232.
- Marc Fleurbaey, 2000. "Choix social : une difficulté et de multiples possibilités," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 1215-1232.
- M. Fleurbaey, 2000. "Choix social : une difficulté et de multiples possibilités," THEMA Working Papers 2000-23, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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