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Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott

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Author Info
Geoffroy de Clippel

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Abstract

Most contributions in axiomatic bargaining are phrased in the space of utilities. This comes in sharp contrast with standards in most other fields of economic theory. The present paper shows how Nash’s original axiomatic system can be rephrased in a natural class of economic environments with lotteries, and how his uniqueness result can be recovered, provided one completes the system with a property of independence with respect to preferences over unfeasible alternatives. Similar results can be derived for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution if and only if bargaining may involve multiple goods. The paper also introduces a distinction between welfarism and cardinal welfarism, and emphasizes that the Nash solution is ordinally invariant on the class of von Neumann-Morgensterm preferences.

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-5.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-5

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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Related research
Keywords: Bargaining; Welfarism; Nash; Kalai-Smorodinsky; Expected Utility;

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  11. Karni, Edi & Schmeidler, David, 1976. "Independence of nonfeasible alternatives, and independence of nonoptimal alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 488-493, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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