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Bargaining and Boldness

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  • Burgos, Albert
  • Grant, Simon
  • Kajii, Atsushi

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 38 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 28-51

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:1:p:28-51

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  2. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
  3. Aumann, Robert J & Kurz, Mordecai, 1977. "Power and Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1137-61, July.
  4. Hong, Chew Soo & Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 1987. "Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 370-381, August.
  5. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
  6. Uzi Segal, 1989. "Two-Stage Lotteries Without the Reduction Axiom," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 552, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Gul, Faruk, 1991. "A Theory of Disappointment Aversion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 667-86, May.
  8. Uzi Segal, 1985. "The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 362, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Safra Zvi & Zilcha Itzhak, 1993. "Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 288-306, April.
  10. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  11. Machina, Mark J, 1987. "Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 121-54, Summer.
  12. Yaari, Menahem E, 1987. "The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 95-115, January.
  13. Houba, Harold & Tieman, Alexander F. & Brinksma, Rene, 1998. "The Nash bargaining solution for decision weight utility functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 41-48, July.
  14. Valenciano Federico & Zarzuelo Jose M., 1994. "On the Interpretation of Nonsymmetric Bargaining Solutions and Their Extension to Nonexpected Utility Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 461-472, November.
  15. Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 1995. "A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1241-49, September.
  16. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  17. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-86, September.
  18. Machina, Mark J, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1622-68, December.
  19. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
  20. Cubitt, Robin P & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1998. "Dynamic Choice and the Common Ratio Effect: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1362-80, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans, 2003. "The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 154-175, May.
  2. Parkash Chander, 2006. "Repetitive risk aversion," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 701-711, November.
  3. Paola Manzini, 2001. "Time Preferences: Do They Matter in Bargaining?," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 445, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  4. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp265, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 17-24, September.

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