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Bargaining and Boldness

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  • Burgos, Albert
  • Grant, Simon
  • Kajii, Atsushi

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  • Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Bargaining and Boldness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 28-51, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:1:p:28-51
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    1. Segal, Uzi, 1990. "Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 349-377, March.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Yaari, Menahem E, 1987. "The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 95-115, January.
    4. Segal, Uzi, 1987. "The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(1), pages 175-202, February.
    5. Valenciano Federico & Zarzuelo Jose M., 1994. "On the Interpretation of Nonsymmetric Bargaining Solutions and Their Extension to Nonexpected Utility Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 461-472, November.
    6. Chew, Soo Hong, 1983. "A Generalization of the Quasilinear Mean with Applications to the Measurement of Income Inequality and Decision Theory Resolving the Allais Paradox," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1065-1092, July.
    7. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-399, March.
    8. Hong, Chew Soo & Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 1987. "Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 370-381, August.
    9. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    10. Machina, Mark J, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1622-1668, December.
    11. Safra Zvi & Zilcha Itzhak, 1993. "Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 288-306, April.
    12. Houba, Harold & Tieman, Alexander F. & Brinksma, Rene, 1998. "The Nash bargaining solution for decision weight utility functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 41-48, July.
    13. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
    14. Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 1995. "A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1241-1249, September.
    15. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    16. Aumann, Robert J & Kurz, Mordecai, 1977. "Power and Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1137-1161, July.
    17. Gul, Faruk, 1991. "A Theory of Disappointment Aversion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 667-686, May.
    18. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-1186, September.
    19. Cubitt, Robin P & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1998. "Dynamic Choice and the Common Ratio Effect: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1362-1380, September.
    20. Machina, Mark J, 1987. "Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 121-154, Summer.
    21. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paola Manzini, 2001. "Time preferences: do they matter in bargaining?," Experimental 0106001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Parkash Chander, 2006. "Repetitive risk aversion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 701-711, November.
    3. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Economic theory and game theory 014, Oscar Volij.
    4. Hanany, Eran, 2007. "Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 72-84, April.
    5. Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Corrigendum to "Bargaining and boldness": [Games Econ. Behav. 38 (2002) 28-51]," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 165-168, October.
    6. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 17-24, September.
    7. Hanany, Eran, 2008. "The ordinal Nash social welfare function," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(5-6), pages 405-422, April.
    8. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    9. Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans, 2003. "The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 154-175, May.
    10. Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2017. "Time Preferences and Bargaining," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 38, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

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