A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility
AbstractWe show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 10128.
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, September 2002, vol. 44 no. 1
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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