Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs Without Independence
AbstractR. J. Aumann and A. Brandenburger (1995) provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that their result can be generalized to the case where players' preferences over uncertain outcomes belong to a large class of nonexpected utility preferences. (c) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 5169.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, August 1996, vol. 70 no. 2, pp. 391-406
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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Other versions of this item:
- Volij, Oscar, 1996. "Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 391-406, August.
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- Oscar Volij, 2002.
"A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility,"
Economic theory and game theory
016, Oscar Volij.
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