A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility
AbstractWe show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 44 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Green, Jerry, 1987.
""Making book against oneself," the Independence Axiom, and Nonlinear Utility Theory,"
3203640, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Green, Jerry, 1987. ""Making Book against Oneself," the Independence Axiom, and Nonlinear Utility Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(4), pages 785-96, November.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-86, September.
- Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002.
"On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 120-140, October.
- Uzi Segal, 1989.
"Two-Stage Lotteries Without the Reduction Axiom,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
552, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dekel, Eddie & Safra, Zvi & Segal, Uzi, 1991. "Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 229-246, December.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
- Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
- Volij, Oscar, 1996.
"Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 391-406, August.
- Volij, Oscar, 1996. "Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs Without Independence," Staff General Research Papers 5169, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Irving H. LaValle & Kenneth R. Wapman, 1986. "Note---Rolling Back Decision Trees Requires the Independence Axiom!," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 382-385, March.
- Rakesh Sarin & Peter Wakker, 1994. "Folding Back in Decision Tree Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(5), pages 625-628, May.
- Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 1995. "A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1241-49, September.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Fishburn, Peter C & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Time Preference," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 677-94, October.
- Zilcha & I. & Safra, Z., 1990.
"Bargaining Solutions Without The Expected Utility Hypothesis,"
33-90, Tel Aviv.
- Safra Zvi & Zilcha Itzhak, 1993. "Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 288-306, April.
- Crawford, Vincent P., 1990. "Equilibrium without independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 127-154, February.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Bargaining and Boldness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 28-51, January.
- Hanany, Eran & Safra, Zvi, 2000. "Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 254-276, February.
- Efe A Ok & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2003. "A General Theory of Time Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 234936000000000089, UCLA Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.