Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence
AbstractR. J. Aumann and A. Brandenburger (1995) provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that their result can be generalized to the case where players' preferences over uncertain outcomes belong to a large class of nonexpected utility preferences. (c) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 70 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Volij, Oscar, 1996. "Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs Without Independence," Staff General Research Papers 5169, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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- Oscar Volij, 2002.
"A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility,"
Economic theory and game theory
016, Oscar Volij.
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