An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players
AbstractShapley proved the existence of an ordinal, symmetric and efficient solution for three-player bargaining problems. Ordinality refers to the covariance of the solution with respect to order-preserving transformations of utilities. The construction of this solution is based on a special feature of the three-player utility space: given a Pareto surface in this space, each utility vector is the ideal point of a unique utility vector, which we call a ground point for the ideal point. Here, we extend Shapley's solution to more than three players by proving first that for each utility vector there exists a ground point. Uniqueness, however, is not guaranteed for more than three players. We overcome this difficulty by the construction of a single point from the set of ground points, using minima and maxima of coordinates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0310002.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 08 Oct 2003
Date of revision:
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Bargaining problems; Ordinal utility; Bargaining solutions;
Other versions of this item:
- Safra, Zvi & Samet, Dov, 2004. "An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 129-142, January.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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