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Inequality Averse Collective Choice

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  • Ok, E.A.

Abstract

The Lorenz-Pareto Optimal Frontier of a collective choice problem indentifies a (usually quite large) subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. We study the basic properties of Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and in particular obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such functions.

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9383/RR96-36.PDF
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 96-36.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-36

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
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Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Keywords: COLLECTIVE CHOICE; BARGAINING;

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References

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  1. Dasgupta, Partha & Sen, Amartya & Starrett, David, 1973. "Notes on the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 180-187, April.
  2. P. L. Yu, 1973. "A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(8), pages 936-946, April.
  3. Bossert, W., 1993. "The Kaldor Compensation Test and Rational Choice," Working Papers 9301, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics.
  4. Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 1996. "Consistency, Replication Invariance, and Generalized Gini Bargaining Solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 367-386, May.
  5. Yaari, Menahem E, 1977. "A Note on Separability and Quasiconcavity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1183-86, July.
  6. Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 1994. "Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1161-78, September.
  7. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January.
  8. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Peters Hans & Wakker Peter, 1994. "WARP Does Not Imply SARP for More Than Two Commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 152-160, February.
  10. Elchanan Ben Porath & Itzhak Gilboa, 1991. "Linear Measures, the Gini Index and the Income-Equality Tradeoff," Discussion Papers 944, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521343831 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
  13. WEYMARK, John A., . "Generalized Gini inequality indices," CORE Discussion Papers RP -453, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Bossert, Walter, 1994. "Rational choice and two-person bargaining solutions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 549-563, November.
  15. Lensberg, Terje, 1987. "Stability and Collective Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 935-61, July.
  16. Fields, Gary S & Fei, John C H, 1978. "On Inequality Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 303-16, March.
  17. Peters, Hans & Wakker, Peter, 1991. "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1787-1801, November.
  18. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1978. "On Revealed Preference Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 121-31, February.
  19. Shorrocks, Anthony F, 1983. "Ranking Income Distributions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(197), pages 3-17, February.
  20. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
  21. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  22. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Marco Mariotti & Roberto Veneziani, 2012. "Opportunities as chances: maximising the probability that everybody succeeds," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2012-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.

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