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Inequality Averse Collective Choice

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  • Ok, E.A.

Abstract

The Lorenz-Pareto Optimal Frontier of a collective choice problem indentifies a (usually quite large) subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. We study the basic properties of Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and in particular obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ok, E.A., 1996. "Inequality Averse Collective Choice," Working Papers 96-36, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-36
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    1. Marco Mariotti & Roberto Veneziani, 2018. "Opportunities as Chances: Maximising the Probability that Everybody Succeeds," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(611), pages 1609-1633, June.
    2. Karsu, Özlem & Morton, Alec & Argyris, Nikos, 2018. "Capturing preferences for inequality aversion in decision support," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(2), pages 686-706.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    COLLECTIVE CHOICE; BARGAINING;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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