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Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solution

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Author Info

  • Blackorby, C.
  • Bossert, W.
  • Donaldson, D.

Abstract

This paper introduces and characterizes a new class of solutions to cooperative bargaining problems that can be rationalized by generalized Gini orderings defined on the agents' utility gains. Generalized Ginis are orderings that can be represented by quasi-concave, nondecreasing functions that are linear in rank-ordered subspaces of Euclidean space. In the case of three or more agents, the authors' characterization of (multivalued) generalized Gini bargaining solutions uses a linear invariance requirement in addition to some standard conditions. In the two-person case, the generalized Gini bargaining solutions can be characterized with a weakening of linear invariance. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 93a12.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:93a12

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Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.
Phone: 04.91.14.07.70
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Web page: http://www.greqam.fr/
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Keywords: bargaining;

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Cited by:
  1. Jean-Yves Duclos & Abdelkrim Araar, 2003. "An Atkinson-Gini family of social evaluation functions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(19), pages 1-16.
  2. Ok, Efe A., 1998. "Inequality averse collective choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 301-321, October.
  3. Miguel Ángel Hinojosa & Amparo Mª Mármol & José Manuel Zarzuelo, 2007. "Multi-Utilitarian Bargaining Solutions," Working Papers 07.13, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
  4. Marco Mariotii, 1996. "Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Game Theory and Information 9611003, EconWPA, revised 27 Nov 1996.
  5. Francois Maniquet, 2002. "On the Equivalence between Welfarism and Equality of Opportunity," Economics Working Papers 0022, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:19:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. M. Hinojosa & A. Mármol & J. Zarzuelo, 2008. "Inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 597-618, December.
  8. Ok, Efe A. & Zhou, Lin, 2000. "The Choquet Bargaining Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 249-264, November.

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