Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule
AbstractWe consider situations in which agents are notable to completely distinguish between all alternatives. Preferences respect individual objective indifferences if any two alternatives are indifferent whenever an agent cannot distinguish between them. We present necessary and sufficient conditions of such a domain of preferences under which majority rule is quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winner sexist for any set of alternatives. Finally, we compare our proposed restrictions with others in the literature, to conclude that they are independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2007-02.
Date of creation: 2007
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Quasi-Transitivity ; Majority Rule;
Other versions of this item:
- Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers, 2011. "Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 559-574, October.
- Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers, 2003. "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule," Working Papers 15, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- EHLERS, Lars & BARBERÀ, Salvador, 2007. "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule," Cahiers de recherche 02-2007, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Salvador Barber?Author-Email: firstname.lastname@example.org & Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 512.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers, 2003. "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 599.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Feb 2007.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-02-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-02-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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