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The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory

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  • Philippe Mongin

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Abstract

Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ‘general logic’ built in this framework. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 73 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 315-355

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:73:y:2012:i:3:p:315-355

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

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Keywords: Judgment aggregation; Logical aggregation; Doctrinal paradox; Discursive dilemma; General logic; Premiss-based vs. conclusion-based approach; Social choice theory; Impossibility theorems; D 70; D 71; D 79;

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Cited by:
  1. Frederik Herzberg, 2014. "Respect for experts or respect for unanimity? The liberal paradox in probabilistic opinion pooling," Working Papers 513, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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