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Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game

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  • Tarik Tazdaït

    ()
    (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement [CIRAD] : UMR56 - CNRS : UMR8568 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - AgroParisTech)

  • Moussa Larbani
  • Rabia Nessah

    (LEM - Lille - Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR8179 - Université Lille I - Sciences et technologies - Fédération Universitaire et Polytechnique de Lille)

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    Abstract

    In this paper, we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium which is also a Pareto efficient (SBPE) and the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). We prove that any SBPE is also a SNE, we prove also existence theorem of SBPE based on the KyFan inequality. Finally, we also provide a method for computing SPBE.

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    File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/27/14/64/PDF/BergeStrong-Preprint.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series CIRED Working Papers with number halshs-00271464.

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    Date of creation: 05 Dec 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:ciredw:halshs-00271464

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00271464
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    Related research

    Keywords: Strong Berge equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; strong Nash equilibrium; Ky Fan inequality;

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    1. Michel Le Breton & Hideo Konishi & Shlomo Weber, 1996. "Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 97-113.
    2. Tarik Tazdaït & Moussa Larbani & Rabia Nessah, 2007. "On Berge Equilibrium," CIRED Working Papers halshs-00271452, HAL.
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