Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game
AbstractIn this paper, we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium which is also a Pareto efficient (SBPE) and the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). We prove that any SBPE is also a SNE, we prove also existence theorem of SBPE based on the KyFan inequality. Finally, we also provide a method for computing SPBE.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series CIRED Working Papers with number halshs-00271464.
Date of creation: 05 Dec 2007
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Strong Berge equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; strong Nash equilibrium; Ky Fan inequality;
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- Michel Le Breton & Hideo Konishi & Shlomo Weber, 1996.
"Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 97-113.
- Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995. "Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 95a39, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Tarik Tazdaït & Moussa Larbani & Rabia Nessah, 2007. "On Berge Equilibrium," CIRED Working Papers halshs-00271452, HAL.
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