Lorenzo Rocco () (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca)
Abstract
This paper aims to explore the peak-load price results arising in a congestion game setting. A continuum of players decide when consuming a service (say, during the day or the night): for instance, they choose when connecting to internet or when driving a car in the road network. The utility they get is a function of the individual preferences and of the aggregate behavior of the other players. Therefore day and night demands are endogenous. We consider what prices a social planner imposes to drive the players' choice towards the equilibrium distribution of first best. Moreover, we consider what prices (and what distribution) a monopolist, maximizing his profit, chooses, when he has to satisfy an universal service requirement and when he may restrict his supply. Finally, we determine which capacity level is optimal to install for either a social planner or a monopolist in this setting.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
54.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roberto Reale).
Related research
Keywords:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: