The main objective of this paper is to propose a model to discuss some aspects of the interaction between the environmental and trade policies. The analysis is conducted both for the socially optimal policies and the policies that would emerge from majority voting. Finally the arguments are explored in a stategic context i.e. when the policies are calculated as Nash equilibria of a non-cooperative game. Finally, we suggest how to use this setting to model a joint negociation on environmental and trade issues.
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Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number
96a37.
Length: 25 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:96a37
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