Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?
AbstractRecently Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (1995) have provided a popular support for progressivity theorem that says that a marginal progressive tax always defeats a marginal regressive tax as long as individuals vote for the tax scheme minimizing their tax liabilities and the median income is less than the mean income. In this paper we provide, under similar circumstances, a popular support for regressivity theorem according to which more marginal regressivity (or less marginal progressivity) can always defeat any existing tax scheme. This move towards more regressivity (or less progressivity) is supported by the extremes of the income distribution. Combining this result with Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin's result implies that vote cycling is inevitable and that the demand for progressivity cannot be established in the standard Downsian framework with self-interested voters.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 73 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- HINDRIKS, Jean, . "Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1535, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean Hindriks, 2000. "Is There a Demand for Income Tax Progressivity?," Working Papers 415, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John Roemer, 2003.
"The Democratic Political Economy Of Progressive Income Taxation,"
9711, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- John E. Roemer, 1999. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 1-20, January.
- John E. Roemer, 1997. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation," Discussion Papers 97-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- John E. Roemer, . "The Democratic Political Economy Of Progressive Income Taxation," Department of Economics 97-11, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Myles, Gareth D., 2000. "On the optimal marginal rate of income tax," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-119, January.
- Snyder, James M. & Kramer, Gerald H., 1988.
"Fairness, self-interest, and the politics of the progressive income tax,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 197-230, July.
- Kramer, Gerald H. & Snyder, James M., 1983. "Fairness, Self-Interest, and the Politics of the Progressive Income Tax," Working Papers 498, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño Ortín, 1995. "Popular Support For Progressive Taxation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 2000. "Choosing from a weighted tournament1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 85-109, July.
- De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000.
"The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects,"
00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
- DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, . "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Marhuenda, Francisco & Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio, 1995. "Popular support for progressive taxation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 319-324, June.
- Young, H Peyton, 1990. "Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 253-66, March.
- Mitra, Tapan & Ok, Efe A. & Kockesen, Levent, 1998. "Popular support for progressive taxation and the relative income hypothesis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 69-76, January.
- Jenny de Freitas, 2009.
"A probabilistic voting model of progressive taxation with incentive effects,"
Hacienda Pública Española,
IEF, vol. 190(3), pages 9-26, September.
- Jenny De Freitas, 2009. "A Probabilistic Voting Model of Progressive Taxation with Incentive Effects," DEA Working Papers 34, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
- Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2003. " Eating the Rich vs. Feeding the Poor: Borrowing Constraints and the Reluctance to Redistribute," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 351-66, September.
- Matias Nunez, 2007. "Tax avoidance and the political appeal of progressivity," Working Papers hal-00243060, HAL.
- Soumyanetra Munshi, 2011. "On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-37, June.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2007.
"A Positive Theory of Income Taxation,"
Departmental Working Papers
200706, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Zsofia Barany, 2011. "Income inequality and the progressivity of taxes in a coalition formation model," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompq, Sciences Po.
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09i8hj22lpn is not listed on IDEAS
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.