The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation
AbstractThe theory of fair allocation is often favourably contrasted with the social choice theory in the search for escape routes from Arrow's impossibility theorem. Its success is commonly attributed to the fact that it is modest in its goal vis-`a-vis social choice theory, since it does not aspire for a full-edged ordering of options, and settles with a subset of fair options. We show that its success may rather be attributable to a broadened informational basis thereof. To substantiate this claim, we compare the informational basis of the theory of fair allocation with the informational requirements of social choice theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2002-11.
Length: 32 p.
Date of creation: Nov 2002
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Note: This version: November 2002 (First version: July 2001), This paper is derived from an earlier draft of our paper entitled "Informational requirements for social choice in economic environments".
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Other versions of this item:
- Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 311-341, 04.
- Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation," Discussion Paper 122, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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