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The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation

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  • Fleurbaey, Marc
  • Suzumura, Kotaro
  • Tadenuma, Koichi

Abstract

The theory of fair allocation is often favourably contrasted with the social choice theory in the search for escape routes from Arrow's impossibility theorem. Its success is commonly attributed to the fact that it is modest in its goal vis-`a-vis social choice theory, since it does not aspire for a full-edged ordering of options, and settles with a subset of fair options. We show that its success may rather be attributable to a broadened informational basis thereof. To substantiate this claim, we compare the informational basis of the theory of fair allocation with the informational requirements of social choice theory.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/17006/1/070econDP02-11.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2002-11.

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Length: 32 p.
Date of creation: Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2002-11

Note: This version: November 2002 (First version: July 2001), This paper is derived from an earlier draft of our paper entitled "Informational requirements for social choice in economic environments".
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  1. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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Cited by:
  1. Marc Fleurbaey & Koichi Tadenuma, 2007. "Do irrelevant commodities matter?," Post-Print hal-00246315, HAL.
  2. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2007. "Two criteria for social decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 421-447, May.
  3. Jean-François Laslier, 2004. "Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate," Working Papers hal-00242909, HAL.
  4. John A Weymark, . "Social Welfare Functions," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers vuecon-sub-13-00018, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  5. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
  6. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off And the Dimensions of Individual Well-Being," IDEP Working Papers, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France 0312, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
  7. Sakai, Toyotaka, 2009. "Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 16-22, January.
  8. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 511-527, April.

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