An extension of McGarvey’s theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 38 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
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- Michel Le Breton & Guillaume Hollard, 1996.
"Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 451-455.
- Hollard, G. & Le Breton, M., 1995. "Logrolling and a McGarvey Theorem for Separable Tournaments," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a08, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- James S. Weber, 2002. "How many voters are needed for paradoxes?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 341-355.
- Saari, Donald G., 1989. "A dictionary for voting paradoxes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 443-475, August.
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