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Citations for "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games"

by Joseph Farrell.

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  1. Cassing, James & To, Ted, 2008. "Antidumping, signaling and cheap talk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 373-382, July.
  2. Blume, A., 1997. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Working Papers 97-11, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  3. Kawamura, Kohei, 2013. "Eliciting information from a large population," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-54.
  4. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2009. "Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 126-136, September.
  5. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2000. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-16, March.
  6. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
  7. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
  8. Crawford, Vincent P., 2001. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6k65014s, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  9. Jorge M. Streb & Gustavo Torrens, 2015. "Meaningful Talk," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 88194, Inter-American Development Bank.
  10. Calcott, Paul, 2004. "Government warnings and the information provided by safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 71-88, March.
  11. Rune Hagen, 2012. "Certified or branded?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 203-230, June.
  12. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  13. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
  14. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Discussion papers 05018, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  15. Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7411, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Tao Li, 2014. "Expert advising under checks and balances," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 477-502, February.
  17. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.
  18. Chan, Jimmy & Suen, Wing, 2009. "Media as watchdogs: The role of news media in electoral competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 799-814, October.
  19. Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Damme, Eric & Potters, Jan, 2011. "Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 244-261, September.
  20. Blume, A. & De Jong, D.V. & Kim, Y.G. & Sprinkle, G.B., 1994. "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games: An Experiment," Papers 9491, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  21. Paola Manzini & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2002. "On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices," Working Papers 456, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  22. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
  23. Calcott, Paul, 2008. "Liability and manufacturer warnings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 98-105, June.
  24. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2006. "Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 164-186, May.
  25. Paul Calcott, 1999. "Demand inducement as cheap talk," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(8), pages 721-733.
  26. Facundo Albornoz & Joan Esteban & Paolo Vanin, 2009. "Government Information Transparency," Discussion Papers 09-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  27. Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, 2013. "Go Figure: The Strategy of Nonliteral Speech," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 186-212, May.
  28. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1203, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  29. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  30. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000664, UCLA Department of Economics.
  31. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2015. "Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication, and Reputational Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 109-49, November.
  32. Spector, David, 2000. "Pure communication between agents with close preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 171-178, February.
  33. Wernerfelt, Birger, 2003. "Organizational Languages," Working papers 4278-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  34. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  35. K.J.M. De Jaegher & R. van Rooij, 2011. "Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests," Working Papers 11-25, Utrecht School of Economics.
  36. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 438, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  37. Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
  38. Ryan, Matthew & Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2011. "Verifiability and neologism-proofness in a Sender-Receiver game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 256-262, August.
  39. Hammad Siddiqi, 2007. "Stock Price Manipulation : The Role of Intermediaries," Finance Working Papers 22280, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  40. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-153/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  41. Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid, 2001. "Cooperation and computability in n-player games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 99-137, September.
  42. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.
  43. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007.
  44. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2007. "When are Auctions Best?," Economics Papers 2007-W03, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  45. Steven A. Matthews, 1991. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 950, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  46. Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Potters, J.A.M., 1999. "Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper 1999-46, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  47. Russell Golman, 2016. "Good manners: signaling social preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 73-88, June.
  48. Lydia Mechtenberg, 2007. "Ideology Without Ideologists," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2007-021, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  49. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  50. Myerson, Roger B., 1989. "Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 264-303, June.
  51. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  52. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Coordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1301, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  53. Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2009. "Strong managers, weak boards?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25857, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  54. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2008. "Paradox of Credibility," MPRA Paper 7443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  55. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2003. "Truth or Consequences: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(1), pages 116-130, January.
  56. Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  57. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-055/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  58. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.
  59. Johanna Hertel & John Smith, 2013. "Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 267-291, August.
  60. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 31-53, January.
  61. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Informal communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 180-200, August.
  62. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
  63. Suzuki, Toru, 0. "Directives, expressives, and motivation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  64. Anthony Fai-Tong Chung, 2004. "Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 581, Econometric Society.
  65. Péter Eső & James Schummer, 2009. "Credible deviations from signaling equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 411-430, November.
  66. Okada, Akira, 2016. "A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 318-341.
  67. McCluskey, Jill J., 2000. "A Game Theoretic Approach To Organic Foods: An Analysis Of Asymmetric Information And Policy," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 29(1), April.
  68. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  69. Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  70. Charness, Gary B & Brandts, Jordi, 2002. "Instituto de Análisis Económico," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt2rf5p3rs, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  71. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Experimental 0503005, EconWPA.
  72. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, EconWPA.
    • Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
    • Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  73. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness (Revision of DP 2008-107)," Discussion Paper 2010-80, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  74. Bourjade, Sylvain & Jullien, Bruno, 2004. "Expertise and Bias in Decision Making," MPRA Paper 7251, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2007.
  75. Matthews, Steven A, 1995. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 567-89, May.
  76. V. Denicolo' & P. Garella, 1996. "Bargaining with Noisy Communication," Working Papers 271, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  77. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015. "Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
  78. Kris De Jaegher & Marc Jegers, 2001. "The physician-patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(7), pages 651-668.
  79. Gabriele Jahn & Matthias Schramm & Achim Spiller, 2005. "The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 53-73, December.
  80. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
  81. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)," Discussion Paper 2010-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  82. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-74, May.
  83. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2011. "Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033)," Discussion Paper 2011-139, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  84. Ro’i Zultan, 2013. "Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 789-800, November.
  85. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
  86. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  87. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2014. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans," Vienna Economics Papers 1409, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  88. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2013. "Managerial Economics of Cheap Talk," Working Papers 24, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  89. Sobel, Joel, 2013. "Ten possible experiments on communication and deception," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 408-413.
  90. Nancy A. Lutz, 1988. "Warranties as Signals Under Consumer Moral Hazard," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 867, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  91. Hanjoon Michael Jung, 2008. "Paradox of Credibility," Microeconomics Working Papers 22267, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  92. Lim, Wooyoung, 2012. "Selling authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 393-415.
  93. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 796, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  94. Wei Li, 2004. "Mind Changes in the Design of Reporting Protocols," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000085, UCLA Department of Economics.
  95. Krahmer, Daniel, 2006. "Message-contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 490-506, August.
  96. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
  97. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong & Kaiwen Leong, 2013. "Cheap Talk with Outside Options," Working Papers 16, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  98. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  99. Jorge M. Streb, 2015. "Optimal Relevance in Imperfect Information Games," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 570, Universidad del CEMA.
  100. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2015. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 517, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  101. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
  102. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 159-179.
  103. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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