IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cem/doctra/570.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Relevance in Imperfect Information Games

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge M. Streb

Abstract

I analyze how natural language transmits information about intended actions. This work on imperfect information games complements work on incomplete information games where natural language transmits information about a sender’s type. Unlike solution concepts based on Nash equilibria, the solution concept first takes into account that a message’s literal meaning conveys common understandings, incorporating the semantic feature that only a shared natural language is comprehensible. Second, the equilibrium meaning, which has to do with the actual use of language in a specific game, depends on the strategic context. This setup can be interpreted as a formal pragmatics where the credibility of the message depends on the sender’s incentives to be truthful. Words are not proof of what they state, so mistrust equilibria are always possible. In trust equilibria, the sender aims at optimal relevance.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge M. Streb, 2015. "Optimal Relevance in Imperfect Information Games," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 570, Universidad del CEMA, revised May 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:570
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/570_2017_junio.pdf
    File Function: Current version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/570.pdf
    File Function: Previous version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ricardo F. Crespo, 2012. "Models as signs" as "good economic models," Estudios Economicos, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economia, vol. 29(58), pages 1-12, january-j.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    3. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 1989. "Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 264-303, June.
    5. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
    6. Navin Kartik, 2009. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
    7. Jorge M. Streb & Gustavo Torrens, 2011. "Meaningful talk," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 443, Universidad del CEMA, revised May 2017.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; unilateral communication; conventional signs; semantics; pragmatics;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:570. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valeria Dowding). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cemaaar.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.