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Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests

  • K.J.M. De Jaegher
  • R. van Rooij

This paper combines a literature overview of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics, with new models that fill some voids in the literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibriumrefinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of pragmatic inference.

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Paper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11-25.

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Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:1125
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  1. Glazer, J. & Rubinstein, A., 1997. "Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Papers 17-97, Tel Aviv.
  2. Jacques Cremer & Luis Garicano & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Language and the Theory of the Firm," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000373, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary stability and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 301-312.
  4. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board, 2009. "Intentional Vagueness," Working Papers 381, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2009.
  5. Kris De Jaegher, 2008. "The evolution of Horn's rule," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 275-284.
  6. K. de Jaegher & S. Rosenkranz & U. Weitzel, 2008. "Economic Laboratory Experiment on Horn's Rule," Working Papers 08-27, Utrecht School of Economics.
  7. Board, Oliver J. & Blume, Andreas & Kawamura, Kohei, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
  8. Joseph Farrell., 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Economics Working Papers 8609, University of California at Berkeley.
  9. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  10. Pawlowitsch, Christina, 2008. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 203-226, May.
  11. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  12. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  13. repec:use:tkiwps:2727 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 363-93, April.
  15. K. de Jaegher & R. van Rooij, 2009. "Strategic Vagueness and Appropriate Contexts," Working Papers 09-31, Utrecht School of Economics.
  16. Gerhard Jäger & Lars Koch-Metzger & Frank Riedel, 2009. "Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 420, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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