Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
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KeywordsSignaling games; pragmatics; equilibrium refinements; evolutionary game theory;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CTA-2012-01-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2012-01-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-01-03 (Microeconomics)
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