Nash Codes for Noisy Channels
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More about this item
Keywordssender-receiver game; communication; noisy channel;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-10-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2012-10-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-10-06 (Microeconomics)
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