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Economic Laboratory Experiment on Horn's Rule

Author

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  • K. de Jaegher
  • S. Rosenkranz
  • U. Weitzel

Abstract

This paper develops a framework for empirically testing several alternative game-theoretic rationales for Horn’s rule. It then presents an economic laboratory experiment where these rationales are empirically tested. Subjects seem to coordinate on Horn’s rule where efficiency acts as a focal point. Nevertheless, a weak interpretation of the evolutionary argument is not rejected: prior play does have an effect on future play. This suggests a hierarchy of effects, where the focal point effect dominates the evolutionary effect, with the latter being more pronounced in cheap talk situations.

Suggested Citation

  • K. de Jaegher & S. Rosenkranz & U. Weitzel, 2008. "Economic Laboratory Experiment on Horn's Rule," Working Papers 08-27, Utrecht School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0827
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    File URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/309708/08_27.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. K.J.M. De Jaegher & R. van Rooij, 2011. "Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests," Working Papers 11-25, Utrecht School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Horn’s Rule; Signalling Theory; Pragmatics; Economic Laboratory Experiment;

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