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Citations of
Juan-José Ganuza

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva Zuasti, 2005. "On Information And Competition In Private Value Auctions," Working Papers wp2005_0503, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  2. Aleix Calveras & Juan José Ganuza, 2004. "Responsabilidad Social Corporativa. Una Visión desde la Teoría Económica," Working Papers, Research Center on Health and Economics 797, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    Cited by:

    1. Callado-Muñoz, Francisco J & Utrero-González, Natalia, 2006. "Does it pay to be socially responsible? Evidence from Spanish retail banking sector," Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona 16, Department of Economics, University of Girona. [Downloadable!]

  3. Juan José Ganuza, 2003. "Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations," Economics Working Papers 671, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Simon Board, 2009. "Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 125-135, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    5. Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick, 2005. "Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer," EIB Papers 5/2005, European Investment Bank, Economic and Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]

  4. Juan José Ganuza, 2003. "Competition and Cost Overruns in Procurement," Economics Working Papers 772, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick, 2005. "Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer," EIB Papers 5/2005, European Investment Bank, Economic and Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]

  5. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Caution, Children Crossing: Heterogeneity of Victim's Cost of Care and Negligence Rule," Economics Working Papers 666, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Tim Friehe, 2007. "On the incentive effects of damage averaging in tort law," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
    2. Tim Friehe, 2007. "On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(2). [Downloadable!]
    3. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2003. "Optimal Negligence Rule under Limited Liability," Economics Working Papers 759, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]
    4. Tim Friehe, 2008. "On judgment proofness in the case of bilateral harm," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 175-185, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  6. Juan J. Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2002. "Allocating Ideas: Horizontal Competition in Tournaments," Economics Working Papers 594, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Carlo Reggiani, . "Optimal Differentiation and Spatial Competition: The Spokes Model with Product Delivery," Discussion Papers 09/13, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    2. Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Rønde, 2005. "Leveraging Resistance to Change and the Skunk Works Model of Innovation," CIE Discussion Papers 2007-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
    3. Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2006. "Tournaments and Liquidity Constraints for the Agents," Working Paper Series 019, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]

  7. Aleix Calveras & Juan J. Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2001. "Wild Bids. Gambling for Resurrection in Procurement Contracts," Economics Working Papers 553, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Gunnar Alexandersson & Staffan Hultén, 2006. "Predatory bidding in competitive tenders: A Swedish case study," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 73-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. RLobert F. Vesztegy, Serizawa & Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2009. "Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling:Theoretical and Experimental Results," ISER Discussion Paper 0747, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
    3. Kenju Akai & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2009. "Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting," ISER Discussion Paper 0740, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]

  8. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2001. "Organized vs. Competitive Corruption," Economics Working Papers 526, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and Competition in Procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  9. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and Competition in Procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Marco Celentani & Juan José Ganuza & José L. Peydró, 2003. "Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions," Economics Working Papers 670, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Susanne Büchner & Andreas Freytag & Luis G. Gonzalez & Werner Güth, 2006. "Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-30, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2001. "Organized vs. Competitive Corruption," Economics Working Papers 526, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]
    4. Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2005. "Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," Discussion Papers 39, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortman & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption And Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    6. Reiss, J. Philipp & Schöndube Jens Robert, 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memoranda 003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    7. Mike Felgenhauer, 2007. "Policy Bias Equivalence under Common Agency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 295-312, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    8. Frédéric Boehm, 2005. "Corrupción y captura en la regulación de los servicios públicos," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 7(13), pages 245-263, July-Dece. [Downloadable!]
    9. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2007. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]

  10. Juan J. Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2000. "Economic Integration and Corruption: The Corrupt Soul of the European Union," Economics Working Papers 482, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Claudio Weber Abramo, 2003. "Prevention and detection in bribery-affected public procurement," Public Economics 0309001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

  11. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 1999. "Corruption and the Hadleyburg Effect," Economics Working Papers 382, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and Competition in Procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2001. "Organized vs. Competitive Corruption," Economics Working Papers 526, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]

  12. Juan J. Ganuza & Lambros Pechlivanos, 1998. "Heterogeneity-promoting Optimal Procurement," Economics Working Papers 377, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 1999. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2005. "Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter," CEPR Discussion Papers 5276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2006. "Procurement When Price and Quality Matter," Working Papers 06-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  13. Juan J. Ganuza, 1998. "Competition and Cost Overruns. Optimal Misspecification of Procurement Contracts," Economics Working Papers 471, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Aleix Calveras & Juan J. Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2001. "Wild Bids. Gambling for Resurrection in Procurement Contracts," Economics Working Papers 553, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2001. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

Articles

  1. Juan-José Ganuza, 2004. "Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model of Endogenous Private Valuations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 583-598, Autumn.

    Cited by:

    1. Juan José Ganuza, 2003. "Competition and Cost Overruns in Procurement," Economics Working Papers 772, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    2. Juan-Jose Ganuza & Jose S. Penalva-Zuasti, 2005. "On Information Revelation in Private Value Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000520, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    3. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Economics Working Papers 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
    5. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva Zuasti, 2005. "On Information And Competition In Private Value Auctions," Working Papers wp2005_0503, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]

  2. Aleix Calveras & Juan-Jose Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2004. "Wild Bids. Gambling for Resurrection in Procurement Contracts," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 41-68, 07. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  3. Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  4. Ganuza, Juan-Jose & Pechlivanos, Lambros, 2000. "Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 105-112, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.

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