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Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study -

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Author Info
Susanne Büchner ()
Andreas Freytag
Luis G. Gonzalez
Werner Güth ()

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Abstract

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider. The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private cost assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjects treatment) to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low. Although bids are lower than predicted, behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction. When bribes generate a negative externality, there is a significant increase in the variability of the data.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2005-30.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2005-30

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Keywords: Corruption Procurement Auctions

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  1. Beck, Paul J. & Maher, Michael W., 1986. "A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-5. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2000. "Auctions and Corruption," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and Competition in Procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Roberto Burguet & Yeon-Koo Che, 2004. "Competitive Procurement with Corruption," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 50-68, Spring.
  5. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986. "A note on competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 337-341. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Compte, O. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. & Verdier, T., 2000. "Corruption and Competition in Public Market Auctions," DELTA Working Papers 2000-01, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jens J. Krüger, 2006. "The Sources of Aggregate Productivity Growth - U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1958-1996," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 10/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  2. Simon Renaud, 2006. "Works Councils and Heterogeneous Firms," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 16/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wolfgang Domschke & Armin Scholl, 2006. "Heuristische Verfahren," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 08/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  4. Uwe Cantner & Andreas Meder, 2006. "Determinants influencing the choice of a cooperation partner," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 20/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  5. Armin Scholl & Nils Boysen & Malte Fliedner, 2006. "The sequence-dependent assembly line balancing problem," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 18/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  6. Simon Renaud, 2006. "Betriebsräte und Strukturwandel," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 04/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  7. Holger Graf & Tobias Henning, 2006. "Public Research in Regional Networks of Innovators: A Comparative Study of Four East-German Regions," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 19/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jens J. Krüger & Kristina Dreßler, 2006. "Knowledge, Profitability and Exit of German Car Manufacturing Firms," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 15/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
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