Combating corruption in international business transactions
AbstractWe analyze the impact of different types of international conventions that require signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found to have bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penalties under a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in which signatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign public officials.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 670.
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision: Oct 2003
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
International corruption; OECD convention;
Other versions of this item:
- Marco Celentani & Juan-José Ganuza & José-Luis Peydró, 2004. "Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71(283), pages 417-448, 08.
- Juan-José Ganuza & Marco Celentani & José-Luis Peydró, 2003. "Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions," Working Papers 106, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-05-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2004-05-16 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2004-05-26 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kevin E. Davis, 2002. "Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 314-340.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
- Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000.
"Corruption and competition in procurement,"
Economics Working Papers
464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
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