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Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions

Author

Listed:
  • Juan-José Ganuza
  • Marco Celentani
  • José-Luis Peydró

Abstract

International business transactions pose the problem of deterring bribing of public officials by foreign firms. We first analyze a convention styled after the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" that requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We then study the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan-José Ganuza & Marco Celentani & José-Luis Peydró, 2003. "Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions," Working Papers 106, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:106
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kevin E. Davis, 2002. "Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 4(2), pages 314-340.
    2. Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
    4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Doren Chadee & Banjo Roxas & Alexandre Kouznetsov, 2021. "Corruption, Bribery and Innovation in CEE: Where is the Link?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 174(4), pages 747-762, December.
    2. José Manuel Martins Caetano & António Caleiro, 2005. "Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment:What kind of relationship is there?," Economics Working Papers 18_2005, University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal).
    3. Bahoo, Salman & Alon, Ilan & Paltrinieri, Andrea, 2020. "Corruption in international business: A review and research agenda," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(4).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Corruption; OECD convention;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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