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Crime and public procurement, evidence from municipalities

Author

Listed:
  • Giuseppe Albanese

    (Banca d'Italia)

  • Federico Antellini Russo

    (Luiss �Guido Carli�)

  • Roberto Zampino

    (Consip)

Abstract

The paper analyzes the link between the centralized purchasing of goods and services by municipalities and the context in which these administrations operate. While taking into account a number of factors that can lead to a greater or lesser use of Consip, the work focuses on the link between that choice and the local crime rate. The empirical analysis shows that, in low-crime areas only, an increase in crime is positively correlated with the frequency with which municipalities entrust vendor selection to a third party in order to attempt to limit the risk of inefficiency (passive waste) that would otherwise arise. The relationship is the inverse in high-crime areas, suggesting a growing willingness by municipalities to maintain autonomous control over purchasing, which may be linked to the possibility of extracting some of the rents produced from this activity (active waste).

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Albanese & Federico Antellini Russo & Roberto Zampino, 2015. "Crime and public procurement, evidence from municipalities," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 294, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_294_15
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2015-0294/QEF_294_15.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crime; fraud and corruption; efficiency; public procurement; local finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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