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Responsabilidad social corporativa. Una visión desde la teoría económica

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Abstract

El objetivo de este trabajo es discutir y analizar el concepto de la responsabilidad social corporativa (RSC) desde la teoria económica. Para ello usamos un modelo sencillo que nos permite clarificar algunos aspectos del debate que rodea la RSC. Observamos como la motivación subyacente en las decisiones y estrategias empresariales juega un papel importante en el concepto de RSC; así, aquellas políticas de la empresa que favorecen a alguno de los stakeholders, pero estén simplemente destinadas a incrementar la rentabilidad empresarial, no deberían catalogarse como RSC. Otro aspecto clave de la RSC es su relación e interacción con la intervención y regulación pública. Desde nuestro punto de vista, el papel de la RSC será importante allí donde la regulación pública no puede llegar debido a, por ejemplo, restricciones de información a las que se enfrenta el sector público. Analizamos también el papel y las características del activismo desarrollado por algunos grupos de consumidores (mediante el posible lanzamiento de boicots a las empresas no responsables socialmente). Y, finalmente, nos planteamos la posibilidad de implementar la empresa ’stakeholder’, es decir, la empresa Socialmente Responsable; la conclusión principal en este aspecto es que su implementación se enfrenta a complejos problemas, especialmente en lo que concierne al diseño de los incentivos adecuados para los gestores de estas empresas.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleix Calveras & Juan José Ganuza, 2004. "Responsabilidad social corporativa. Una visión desde la teoría económica," Working Papers, Research Center on Health and Economics 797, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfses:797
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    1. Callado-Muñoz, Francisco J & Utrero-González, Natalia, 2006. "Does it pay to be socially responsible? Evidence from Spanish retail banking sector," Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona 16, Department of Economics, University of Girona.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Responsabilidad Social Corporativa; Stakeholders; Regulación y Boicot de Consumidores;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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