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Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Paul A.Grout
Ian Jewitt
Silvia Sonderegger ()
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This paper discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets. The model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms. We identify a number of forces which determine the success of reform. Focussing particularly on the rent recapture and relationship substitution effects, we highlight their impact on client welfare and quality of legal services in different types of market according to whether clients are transient or repeated users of the service.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number
07/170.
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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:07/170Contact details of provider: Postal: Mary Paley Building, 12 Priory Road, Bristol, BS8 1TN Phone: 0117 954 6943 Fax: 0117 954 6997 Email: Web page: http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: incomplete contracts repeated interactions Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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