Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets
AbstractThis paper discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets. The model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms. We identify a number of forces which determine the success of reform. Focussing particularly on the rent recapture and relationship substitution effects, we highlight their impact on client welfare and quality of legal services in different types of market according to whether clients are transient or repeated users of the service.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 07/170.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
incomplete contracts; repeated interactions;
Other versions of this item:
- Grout, Paul A & Jewitt, Ian & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2006. "Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5959, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality),"
Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January.
- Tirole, J., 1993. "A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Tirole, Jean, 1994. ""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Ã‰conomie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 38, Institut d'Ã‰conomie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Monika Schnitzer, 1994.
"The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts,"
Discussion Paper Serie A
452, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, 1995. "The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 193-199, May.
- Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, 1995. "The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 19763, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1993.
"Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
4480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-56, November.
- Bull, Clive, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 147-59, February.
- Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
- Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.