Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions
AbstractInternational business transactions pose the problem of deterring bribing of public officials by foreign firms. We first analyze a convention styled after the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" that requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We then study the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 106.
Date of creation: Oct 2003
Date of revision:
International Corruption; OECD convention;
Other versions of this item:
- Marco Celentani & Juan-José Ganuza & José-Luis Peydró, 2004. "Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71(283), pages 417-448, 08.
- Marco Celentani & Juan José Ganuza & José L. Peydró, 2003. "Combating corruption in international business transactions," Economics Working Papers 670, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2003.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000.
"Corruption and competition in procurement,"
Economics Working Papers
464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
- Kevin E. Davis, 2002. "Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 314-340.
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- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
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