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Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions

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  • Juan-José Ganuza
  • Marco Celentani
  • José-Luis Peydró

Abstract

International business transactions pose the problem of deterring bribing of public officials by foreign firms. We first analyze a convention styled after the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" that requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We then study the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 106.

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Date of creation: Oct 2003
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:106

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Keywords: International Corruption; OECD convention;

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  1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
  3. Kevin E. Davis, 2002. "Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 314-340.
  4. Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
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