Information Provision in Procurement Auctions
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- Daniel García & Joaquím Coleff, 2013. "Information Provision in Procurement Auctions," Vienna Economics Papers vie1306, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Joaquin Coleff & Daniel Garcia, 2013. "Information Provision in Procurement Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo 11010, Universidad del Rosario.
- Joaquin Coleff & Daniel Garcia, 2013. "Information Provision in Procurement Auctions," Borradores de Investigación 11006, Universidad del Rosario.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Raphaela Hennigs, 2021. "Conflict prevention by Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(4), pages 710-731, August.
- Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2019.
"Political contestability and public contracting,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 945-966, October.
- Moszoro, Marian & Spiller, Pablo, 2019. "Political Contestability and Public Contracting," MPRA Paper 102692, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
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