Information Variability Impacts in Auctions
AbstractA wide variety of auction models exhibit close relationships between the winner's expected profit and the expected difference between the highest and second-highest order statistics of bidders' information, and between expected revenue and the second-highest order statistic of bidders' expected asset values. We use stochastic orderings to see when greater environmental variability of bidders' information enhances expected profit and expected revenue.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 0908.
Length: 9 pgs.
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
affiliated-values auctions; auction revenue; number of bidders; increased competition; endegenous bidder participation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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