Economic integration and corruption: The corrupt soul of the European Union
AbstractWe study the link between corruption and economic integration. We show that if an economic union establishes a common regulation for public procurement, the country more prone to corruption benefits more from integration. However, if the propensities to corruption are too distinct, the less corrupt country will not be willing to join the union. This difference in corruption propensities can be offset by a difference in efficiency. We also show that corruption is lower if integration occurs. A panel data analysis for the European Union confirms that more corrupt countries are more favorable towards integration but less acceptable as potential new members.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 482.
Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Corruption; procurement; economic integration;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
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- Claudio Weber Abramo, 2003. "Prevention and detection in bribery-affected public procurement," Public Economics 0309001, EconWPA.
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