Social wealth and optimal care
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- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Social Wealth and Optimal Care," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-34, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Yoed Halbersberg, 2010. "Liability Standards for Multiple-Victim Torts: A Call for a New Paradigm," Discussion Paper Series dp533, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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More about this item
Keywords
accidents; risk; wealth; care; bodily injury;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2008-07-05 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2008-07-05 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2008-07-05 (Law and Economics)
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