Keeping out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Matthew Roelofs, 2002. "Common Value Auctions with Default: An Experimental Approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(3), pages 233-252, December.
- Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999.
"Toeholds and Takeovers,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 427-454, June.
- Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9608001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9903005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bulow, Jeremy I. & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1486, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- repec:bla:jfinan:v:55:y:2000:i:4:p:1807-1854 is not listed on IDEAS
- Aleix Calveras & Juan-Jose Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2004.
"Wild Bids. Gambling for Resurrection in Procurement Contracts,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 41-68, July.
- Aleix Calveras & Juan J. Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2001. "Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts," Economics Working Papers 553, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2001.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847.
- Francesco Decarolis, 2009.
"When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement,"
Temi di discussione (Economic working papers)
717, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Francesco Decarolis, 2009. "When the Highest Bidder Loses the Auction: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," 2009 Meeting Papers 130, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Paul Klemperer, 2002.
"What Really Matters in Auction Design,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
- Professor Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Microeconomics 0004008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion & Abele, Susanne, 2008.
"Auction fever : theory and experimental evidence,"
Papers
08-27, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion & Abele, Susanne, 2008. "Auction Fever: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-27, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
- Sarah Parlane, 2003.
"Procurement Contracts under Limited Liability,"
The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 34(1), pages 1-21.
- Parlane, S., 1998. "Procurement Contracts under Limited Liability," Papers 98/3, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
- Sarah Parlane, 2003. "Procurement contracts under limited liability," Open Access publications 10197/685, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Christopher Avery & John H. Kagel, 1997. "Second‐Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 573-603, September.
- Engelmann, Dirk & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2005. "A Proxy Bidding Mechanism that Elicits all Bids in an English Clock Auction Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 36, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Simon Board, 2007. "Bidding into the Red: A Model of Post‐Auction Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(6), pages 2695-2723, December.
- Saral, Krista Jabs, 2009. "An Analysis of Market-Based and Statutory Limited Liability in Second Price Auctions," MPRA Paper 25143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lind, Barry & Plott, Charles R, 1991.
"The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 335-346, March.
- Lind, Barry & Plott, Charles., 1989. "The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers," Working Papers 699, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2019.
"Auctions with limited liability through default or resale,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 51-74.
- Marco Pagnozzi & Krista J. Saral, 2018. "Auctions with Limited Liability through Default or Resale," CSEF Working Papers 494, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Marco Pagnozzi & Krista Saral, 2019. "Auctions with limited liability through default or resale," Post-Print halshs-02010914, HAL.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Ottorino Chillemi & Claudio Mezzetti, 2014. "Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 335-355, February.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Burguet, Roberto & Ganuza, Juan-José & Hauk, Esther, 2012.
"Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 15-25.
- Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2009. "Limited Liability and Mechanism Design in Procurement," Working Papers 383, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2009. "Limited Liability and Mechanism Design in Procurement," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 767.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Daley, Brendan & Schwarz, Michael & Sonin, Konstantin, 2012. "Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 104-119.
- Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2011. "Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 84-96, January.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020.
"On the Benefits of Set-Asides,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
- Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688237, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," CIRED Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Post-Print halshs-03229982, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03229982, HAL.
- Lamy, Laurent & Jehiel, Philippe, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," CEPR Discussion Papers 11564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688261, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688231, HAL.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009.
"Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-1575, September.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7411, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," Economics Papers 2009-W05, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Wei-Shiun Chang & Timothy C. Salmon & Krista J. Saral, 2016.
"Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation And Wealth Constraints,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1684-1704, July.
- Chang, Wei-Shiun & Salmon, Timothy C. & Saral, Krista Jabs, 2013. "Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation and Wealth Constraints," MPRA Paper 50137, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lagziel, David, 2019.
"Credit auctions and bid caps,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 416-422.
- David Lagziel, 2018. "Credit Auctions And Bid Caps," Working Papers 1810, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2019.
"Auctions with limited liability through default or resale,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 51-74.
- Marco Pagnozzi & Krista J. Saral, 2018. "Auctions with Limited Liability through Default or Resale," CSEF Working Papers 494, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Marco Pagnozzi & Krista Saral, 2019. "Auctions with limited liability through default or resale," Post-Print halshs-02010914, HAL.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion & Seifert, Stefan & Wang, Runxi, 2024. "Combinatorial auctions for renewable energy — potentials and challenges," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
- Griffin, Robert, 2013. "Auction designs for allocating wind energy leases on the U.S. outer continentalshelf," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 603-611.
- Bernard Lebrun, 2015. "Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(2), pages 245-275, June.
- Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2021. "Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 345-374, December.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017.
"An invitation to market design,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017. "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers 2017-069, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom, 2009.
"Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
14765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom, 2009. "Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Brunner, Christoph & Hu, Audrey & Oechssler, Jörg, 2014.
"Premium auctions and risk preferences: An experimental study,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 467-484.
- Brunner, Christoph & Hu, Audrey & Oechssler, Jörg, 2013. "Premium Auctions and Risk Preferences: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0544, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
- Levin, Dan & Kagel, John H., 2005. "Almost common values auctions revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 1125-1136, July.
- Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2008.
"Vickrey allocation rule with income effect,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 391-401, May.
- Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect," ISER Discussion Paper 0646, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
More about this item
Keywords
Auctions; Bankruptcy; Laboratory Experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2011-02-26 (Experimental Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.