Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders
AbstractThere is a mounting body of evidence that collusive agreements between bidders in large multiple-object procurement tenders are often supported by a corrupt administrator. In a first-price multiple-object auction, if the auctioneer has some legal discretion to allow bidders to readjust their offers prior to the official opening, he also has incentives to extract bribes from agents in exchange for abusing this discretion. In particular, corrupt agent’s incentives to receive bribes are closely linked with that of creating a ’bidding ring’ as the agent’s discretionary power gains value when firms collude. Thus, corruption generates focal equilibria where bidders fully refrain from competing with each other. Additional flexibility of the auction format such as the possibility to submit package bids, which is often considered to be efficiency-enhancing in theoretical literature, increases the risk of collusion in the presence of corruption. Such problems are more likely to arise in tenders, where participating firms are not too close competitors.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0036.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2003
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auctions; corruption; collusion;
Other versions of this item:
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 883-908, December.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590773, HAL.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-11-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2003-11-30 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-EEC-2003-11-30 (European Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2003-11-30 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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